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For many years, statistical discrimination theory (SDT) was as close as economists ever
got to talking about racial stereotypes. Although the primary object of SDT was to explain wage
inequality, it also suggested a simple way to think about group reputations. The generic textbook
version of SDT, for example, implied that stereotypes could arise and persist if employers
compete more effectively as a result of holding and acting upon correct perceptions of mean
unobserved worker quality. Stereotyping, as well as unequal treatment of equally productive
workers, would be efficient and enduring if information on individual productivity is costly, and
if race is correlated with actual but poorly perceived dimensions of productivity.
In contrast, stereotypes would fade if the firm’s appraisal of mean group differences is
wrong. In the long run, stereotypes would therefore correspond to actual differences in expected
quality. The mechanism by which expectations become aligned with reality is different in
different versions of SDT; many, perhaps most, economists subscribe to the “weak” view that
firms acting on incorrect assessments of average group productivity fail (cet. par.) in the long
run. A stronger variant of the argument posits that even when stereotypes correctly identify mean
group differences in productivity, firms still have the incentives and the means to identify high
performers regardless of race; those that do not will fail.1
For some critics of SDT, therein lies its Achilles’ heel: if firms’ expectations do not
correspond to objective racial differences in unobserved productivity, if racial inequality persists
despite inefficient stereotypes, then the theory has missed its mark, failing to explain both wage
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Two quite different accounts of group reputations in an environment of imperfect information are those of
Lundberg and Startz (1983) and Coate and Loury (1993), to be addressed later on.
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inequality and group reputations. The weak version of SDT simply has no way to comprehend
incorrect stereotypes. The strong version rules out any stereotypes in the long run; all are
inefficient.
I will be investigating the persistence of inefficient stereotypes with two commonly
perceived differences between blacks and whites: honesty and work ethic. I focus on these for
several reasons. First, businesspeople believe employee theft is a substantial personnel problem,
with greatest concern expressed by the retail sales, food service, warehousing, banking, and
medical services industries. (Dickens, et. al., 1989; Sackett and Harris, 1984; Murphy, 1993)
Similarly, employers are fully aware of how much they depend upon the “work ethic”, or
discretionary effort and initiative, of their workers. (Bewley, 1999; Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne,
2001)
Second, I want to examine honesty and work ethic because many employers associate
dishonesty and low motivation with black workers, despite the lack of any rigorous evidence
justifying such a view. At the same time, a large number of employers claim not to see any such
racial differences. The heterogeneity of employer opinions, plus the lack of any evidence that
black employees are actually less honest, diligent, or conscientious, provides a strong test case
for the view that employers who statistically discriminate on the basis of race should lose out
over the long run to those who do not.
In contrast to this view, I will argue that information is especially problematic when
employers are assessing the honesty and work ethic of employees. The exceptional ambiguity of
signals about honesty and work ethic, more so than cognitive ability or other types of skill,
approaches Keynes’ notion of uncertainty, in which agents often simply cannot form
mathematical expectations, and instead rely on highly speculative judgments. Especially in this
context, employers do not assess the data within a racially neutral algorithm; rather, they use
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historically salient racialized conventions to navigate the informational void. As a result,
employers’ stereotyping will often exhibit gross inefficiencies. But since these inefficiencies
have far more to do with external than private costs, and with coordination problems, individual
employers typically have little to fear from their own poor judgments.
A final reason to explore stereotypes about honesty and work ethic is that these are not
simply components of productivity. They are also fundamentally moral categories, selectively
bestowing deservingness and social kinship upon different groups. They are building blocks of
racial stigma. (Loury, 2002)
The Skeptics’ Position
At first reckoning, the notion that competitive firms will reject the use of stereotypes in
hiring and wage determination in the long run is compelling. Uncertainty should stimulate a
market for information, and employers should invest in better tests. And if we can accurately
profile serial killers, why can’t we profile embezzlers or shirkers reasonably well?2
The problem has been stated in several different ways. First, Aigner and Cain (1977)
argued:
“If employers mistakenly believe [the mean of white unobservable productivity is greater than the
mean of black unobservable productivity], then they will mistakenly overpay whites relative to blacks, and
we may doubt that such mistaken behavior will persist in competitive markets. Indeed, as an explanation of
discrimination against blacks, a theory of discrimination based on employers’ mistakes is even harder to
accept than the explanation based on employers’ ‘tastes for discrimination’.” (p. 177)

Further, Cain (1986) argued that there should be Pareto-improving arrangements that
reduce testing error for blacks:
“If wage differentials are large merely because of differential test reliability, then both minority
workers and employers have incentives to improve the tests and reduce this impediment to transactions. If,

2

Criminal profiling is often uncannily accurate. See Schauer (2003).
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as is sometimes reasonable to assume, the worker knows his or her own abilities, a low-cost privateexchange method of minimizing this impediment is for workers to offer a trial period of employment to
demonstrate their true productivity. The cost to the worker is a low wage during the trial period, but the
benefits are higher earnings throughout the worker’s subsequent career.” Cain (1986:727)

In another skeptical treatment of SDT, Darity (1989) contends that the informational
“value added” of gender and race should go to zero in the long run:
“…the entrepreneur will recognize that profits are to be had by designing new instruments that
will improve employers’ capacity to evaluate job applicants regardless of the group from which they
originate…Entrepreneurial energy will tear down any obstacles to the pursuit of profit (cf. the implications
of Coase’s work [1960] on externalities). If discriminatory wage gaps signal profit opportunities,
entrepreneurial energy will seek, exploit, and ultimately destroy purely ascriptively based pay
differentials.” (Darity, 1989: 339-340)

Cain’s version of the argument differs somewhat from Darity’s by emphasizing the incentives of
workers rather than employers, and by emphasizing the problem of differential test reliability (an
approach which dates back to Phelps (1972)). However, both authors highlight the mutual costs
of imperfect information and the possibility of a Pareto-improving deal (hence Darity’s reference
to the Coase theorem); Cain suggests a probationary period as one such arrangement.
Employers’ Perceptions of Black Character
While most discussions of SDT focus on skills (especially, as of late, cognitive ability), it
is even more likely that employers cannot directly observe a cluster of traits that we might call
“character”: “habits of action and thought that favor good performance in skilled jobs,
steadiness, punctuality, responsiveness, and initiative.” (Arrow, 1974b, p. 97) When jobs require
few skills, these habits are probably paramount: is the checkout clerk in the grocery store going
to show up on time and move customers through the line expeditiously? Will an assembly line
worker take too many unscheduled absences? Will she pay attention to quality? Will he show up
hung over on Monday morning? Is she going to pilfer inventory or cash? Work ethic is also
5

critical when monitoring is difficult (Huang and Cappelli, 2006). Character is indisputably at the
heart of incomplete labor contract enforcement problems.
Two things may be noted about employer views on black character. First, they are quite
heterogeneous, but, second, they are overall decidedly negative relative to other ethnic groups.
Interviews in the early 1990s of Chicago employers seeking to fill unskilled, entry-level
positions, found that the “employers view[ed] inner-city workers, especially black men, as
unstable, uncooperative, dishonest, and uneducated.” They characterized black workers as
having a “bad work ethic”, creating tension with coworkers, being “lazy and unreliable”, and
having “a bad attitude”. “When asked directly whether they thought there were any differences
in the work ethic of whites, blacks and Hispanics, 37.7 percent of the employers ranked blacks
last, 1.4% ranked Hispanics last, and no one ranked whites there. Another 7.6 percent placed
blacks and Hispanics together on the lowest level; 51.4% either saw no difference or refused to
categorize in a straightforward way.” (Kirschenman and Neckerman, 1991, pp. 204, 210, 213) 3
Similarly, in their interviews of employers of entry-level workers in four major U.S.
cities, Moss and Tilly (2001: p. 97) found that by far the greatest complaint about black workers
was that “blacks have lagging motivation” (33.4% of the employers agreed with that); employers
agreed with that statement far more often than “blacks have lagging hard skills” (20.3%), and
“blacks have lagging interaction skills” (14.6%). Furthermore, employers viewed black
motivation much more negatively than they did that of other ethnic groups. Only 5.4% of the
employers said that Latinos had lagging motivation, and 0.3% of them said that Asians exhibited
this deficiency.
These racial stereotypes are important because motivation and honesty are critical to
employers. According to Holzer, Raphael and Stoll (2002, Appendix Table A1), more than 70%
3

Charles Johnson’s surveys of employers for the National Urban League in the 1920s found a similar variety of
employer opinion. (Johnson, 1930)
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of employers of noncollege workers thought that motivation was a very important requirement of
new employees. In Kirschenman and Neckerman’s interviews of Cook County employers, work
ethic “loom[ed] large among the concerns of employers.” (p. 210) A Census Bureau survey of
3,000 employers found that they rank “attitude” as more important than specific skills or
academic performance. (Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne, 2001)
Employers are also concerned about dishonesty. Although the threat of employee theft is
often exaggerated, the National Retail Security Survey placed the value of employee theft in the
U.S. retail industry alone at $15.1 billion in 2001 (about 0.8% of sales, and nearly three times the
cost of larceny reported to the FBI). (Hollinger and Davis, 2002; Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2002) Anonymous surveys have identified a fairly large number of employees who
admit to occasional theft, although it tends to be infrequent and to involve relatively small
amounts. Hollinger and Clark (1983) found that 41.8% of retail workers admitted to stealing;
32.2% of hospital employees, and 26.2% of manufacturing sector workers did so as well. Slora
(1991) found that one-fourth to one-third of sampled fast food and supermarket workers admitted
to at least occasional cash or property theft (other than eating food). In a study of one call
center’s employees working under an incentive pay scheme (Nagin, et. al., 2002), a significant
subset of workers made more suspicious claims for successful solicitations when they believed
the monitoring rate was lower.
Honesty also matters to employers because it is correlated on personnel tests with
conscientiousness (which I take to be part of what employers have in mind when they are
discussing motivation, work ethic, or attitude). (Ones, Viswesvaran, and Schmidt, 1993; Sackett
and Wanek, 1996; Hogan and Brinkmeyer, 1997) Also, not surprisingly, employers’ views on
racial differences in honesty are similar to their views on motivation. Dishonesty was included in
the employers’ litany of complaints about unmotivated blacks expressed to Kirschenman and
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Neckerman (above). They also recorded the following exchange with a suburban drug store
manager:
“It’s unfortunate, but, in my business I think overall [black men] tend to be known to be dishonest.
I think that’s too bad but that’s the image they have.
(Interviewer: So you think it’s an image problem?)
Yeah, a dishonest, an image problem of being dishonest men and lazy. They’re known to be
lazy…Whether they are or not, I don’t know, but, it’s an image that is perceived.
(Interviewer: I see. How do you think that image was developed?)
Go look in the jails. [laughs].” (Kirschenman and Neckerman, 1991, p. 221)

Employers’ doubts about black honesty, along with customer antipathy, retarded the
entrance of blacks in the northern retail industry after World War II. (Sugrue, 1996) Evidence of
employers’ views on black honesty and criminality also comes more indirectly from the
observation that firms hire more blacks when they use criminal background checks (while
controlling for the black application rate); evidently, the background checks induce employers to
discount their fears about black job applicants who do not have criminal records. (Holzer,
Raphael and Stoll, 2002)
How Employers Test for Character
Tests or other screening mechanisms are critical components of most versions of SDT
and their sequelae (Arrow (1973), Phelps (1972), Lundberg and Startz (1983), Coate and Loury
(1993)). Take for example Phelps’ exposition of the screening problem. He started with an
equation relating test scores (yi) to worker quality or productivity (qi):
qi ' = ay i '+u i ' ; where the variables are in deviation form and E(ui)=0
and an equation describing employer beliefs about the relationship between race and quality:
qi = α + xi + η i , where xi = (− β + ε i )ci .
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Each equation contains an error term, ui and η i + ci ε i , respectively. If the job applicant
is black, ci=1. Phelps presented three possible scenarios of statistical discrimination, two of
which have received a great deal of attention since then:
Phelps case (1): There is no racial difference in expected quality (β=0), but the variance
of white test scores is lower than the variance of black test scores. This makes the white curve
relating q’ to y’ steeper than the corresponding black curve. Employers weight the individual
component of productivity less, and the group component more, than they would with better tests
or signals.4 Further, because the white curve is steeper, the return to investment in unobservable
productivity is lower for blacks, and lower black mean productivity arises endogenously.
(Lundberg and Startz, 1983)
Phelps case (2): Employers believe that black qualifications are lower (β>0) than white
qualifications for a given test score, because of black disadvantages in upbringing. In this case,
the curve relating q’ to y’ shifts down by β. If also ε i ≡ 0 , and var(ui)W=var(ui)B, the slope of the
black line is the same as the slope of the white line. Blacks get uniformly lower wage offers
because, given black social disadvantage, employers believe their test scores are likely to
overestimate actual black productivity: E(q|y)B< E(q|y)W. Phelps suggested that “skin color or
sex is taken as a proxy for relevant data not sampled.” (p. 659) This version is close to the
standard textbook treatment of SDT.
Employers have access to a lot of individualized test data that social scientists generally
do not, from written tests, reference checks, interviews, probationary periods, etc. The skeptics’
rejection of SDT, then, rests to some extent on their confidence in the ability of employers to
design or demand effective screening mechanisms.

4

Aigner and Cain (1977) formulated a variant of the Phelps model with risk aversion, although risk aversion is not
required to get Phelps’ results.
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“the informational assumption …[of SDT] suggests that selectors are incapable of making a
sound approximation about a candidate’s future potential to perform without relying on the additional
signal of group affiliation. This is implausible given the vast resources corporations devote to hiring
decisions and the design of screening mechanisms. Over time, an appropriate set of questions or tests
should emerge that will facilitate selection, regardless of group affiliation.” (Darity, 1998: p. 807)

But a brief survey of the tools employers actually use for assessing honesty and work
ethic will demonstrate that their utility is fundamentally limited, creating an informational
vacuum in which employers will be disposed to consider other factors, including race.
Consider first written tests. There are many commercially available integrity tests (also
called honesty tests), which proliferated after the national ban on polygraph testing for
employment in 1988. In the early 1990s, about 6,000 organizations administered about five
million integrity tests annually (Camara and Schneider, 1994), compared to 6.3 million job
openings reported to state employment agencies in 1993. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000) Twentyeight percent of retail employers responding to the National Retail Security Survey (2005) said
that they used these paper-and-pencil instruments. Such tests inquire about past theft (e.g., how
much someone has stolen from their employers in the past), attitudes toward theft (e.g., whether
the respondent thinks it’s always wrong to steal from the employer), attitudes toward risk, and so
forth. Scores on these tests are also well known to be associated with conscientiousness. (Ones,
Viswesvaran, and Schmidt, 1993; Sackett and Wanek, 1996; Hogan and Brinkmeyer, 1997)
The first limitation of integrity tests is that they only approximate the test characteristic
under clinical, not real-life, conditions. Although some psychologists regard honesty as a basic
aspect of personality that is relatively impervious to situational factors, the balance of evidence
suggests that honesty is neither a purely dispositional nor a purely situational characteristic.
(Sackett and Harris, 1985) As such, there is inevitably an underlying decision rule about how
behavior under test conditions corresponds to behavior in specific work environments (Murphy,
10

1993), with specific technologies, systems of monitoring, penalties for poor performance, work
norms, supervisors, and labor market conditions. The same person can behave quite differently
than predicted if his coworkers look the other way when he steals, if employee morale is low, if
monitoring is relatively difficult, and if alternative jobs are easy to come by.
Second, independent research about the quality of many commercially distributed tests,
and about the care with which the tests are applied, is rare. Most validation studies of honesty
tests have been conducted by the test publishers themselves. (Sackett and Wanek, 1996) The
raw materials of test validation research are in most cases proprietary information. “It is unlikely
that the credibility and quality of research will increase until publishers open up the research
process and encourage independent research.” (Camara and Schneider, 1994: p. 115)
Third, tests are often misused, and employers are often poorly trained to interpret test
results. Fifty-six percent of the integrity test publishers that responded to an American
Psychological Association survey reported that they do not screen potential purchasers at all.
(Camara and Schneider, 1994 and 1995) A similar problem arose some years before in polygraph
testing. Although it was widely known that lie detector tests produce both Type I and Type II
errors, employers’ misuse of lie detector tests was so pervasive that Congress passed the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act in 1988. Reflecting similar concerns, quite a few states have
outlawed other types of honesty tests for selection purposes. (Cooper and Robertson, 1995)
An economist might suspect a problem here: who will test the tester? Most unsuccessful
job applicants have no further contact with the employer and little chance to figure out what went
wrong, to compare notes with other jobseekers, or to evaluate the employer’s care in
administering and interpreting test results. Employers cannot easily evaluate the counterfactual
(would they have equally honest and motivated employees without the test?). Moreover, with
long lines of unemployed and usually honest jobseekers, they typically care more about Type II
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than Type I errors. The testing industry, which is supposed to reduce information problems, has
imperfect incentives to provide high quality information itself.
Fourth, the ability of employers to test more effectively depends critically on the
assumption that prospective employees cannot game the test. However, much research shows
that many occupational honesty tests (unlike cognitive ability tests) are fakeable. “Overt”
honesty tests (in which one is queried directly about stealing, drug use, etc.) are especially
vulnerable to – well, dishonesty. Tests often (but not always) include lie scales to catch the
fakers (Mercer, 1993; Cooper and Robertson, 1995; Murphy, 1993), but these are also vulnerable
to manipulation by a skilled test taker.5 Sackett and Wanek (1996) noted that in several recent
studies, when research subjects were instructed to fake an integrity test, they could raise their
scores. Guastello and Rieke (1991) found that integrity test scores are positively correlated with
scores on lie scales, and that predictive validity fell substantially when correcting for faking.
It’s not that good tests contribute nothing; in fact, they are significantly better than
alternatives such as personal interviews. But their contributions are modest. In the most
comprehensive meta-analysis of honesty testing to date, Ones, Viswesvaran and Schmidt (1993)
found the mean operational predictive validity of 665 integrity tests for predicting supervisory
ratings of job performance to be .41.6 But many integrity tests have not been validated carefully,
or at all. (Camara and Schneider, 1995) Sackett and Wanek (1996) considered the most
compelling studies to be those that tried to predict workplace performance, used a job applicant
sample, and used non-self-report criteria. Only 79 of the 665 validity studies satisfied these
criteria, and their average validities ranged from .09 (for the only seven studies of tests focused
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Lie scales involve adding up the number of socially approved but implausible responses. For example, a test might
ask whether the respondent has ever told a lie, or said anything about someone behind his back that they would not
be willing to repeat to his face.
6
In this context, validity means correlation between test scores and performance measures, usually supervisor
ratings or specific measures of detected counterproductive activity.
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most directly on predicting honesty) to .27 (for tests predicting counterproductive workplace
behavior more broadly defined). In the domain of employment testing, these validities are bad to
mediocre. But even with a respectable average validity of .41, a lot of employees are
misclassified. The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment reported that 95.6% of integrity test
takers who fail are incorrectly labeled as dishonest, which suggests considerable opportunity
costs for employers, besides the obvious consequences for test takers. (Rieke and Guastello,
1995)
So why not check someone’s criminal record? Five-sixths of retail employers do so.
(Hollinger and Langton, 2005) And employers who examine these records do hire more blacks,
even when controlling for the racial composition of the applicant pool. This seems to be because
the record check reduces employers’ reliance on race as a signal, which swamps the effect of
identifying more convicted blacks. (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 2002) But criminal records are
notoriously unreliable (Pager 2003) and this may be a particularly pronounced problem with
commercial services that perform national searches. (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 2002) And, of
course, many criminals are never apprehended.
What about a drug test? Many employers associate drug use with theft. About one in five
or six firms use drug or physical exams, and one-half of retail employers screen for drugs.
(Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 2002; Hollinger and Langton, 2005) However, there is plenty of
information on the internet about how to pass a drug test when you’ve been smoking pot. Since
pot is fat-soluble, though, this takes some creativity. It’s actually easier to hide cocaine and
heroin use.
Employers can also ask for references, they can use probationary periods, and they can
conduct interviews. Reference checks, used by about half of employers in 1982 (Holzer, 1987),
and by three-quarters of employers in the National Retail Security Survey (2005), probably don’t
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resolve the problem entirely, either. Employers have incentives to hide information about their
good workers from other firms. (Greenwald, 1986) Similarly, employers might present their
undesirable employees in a favorable light, to get rid of bad apples while minimizing the hassle
of terminating them. Recently, some firms have adopted policies of not providing references for
former employees, fearing lawsuits. (Bewley, 1999; Altonji and Pierret, 1997) Most
importantly, workers with zero job experience cannot present letters from previous employers,
making imperfect information a particularly thorny problem at the beginning of one’s working
life. And while an unknown number of employers also solicit referrals from current employees,
this is a procedure which favors job applicants with denser networks of employed friends and
family members – not the typical ghetto teenager.
Retail employers are also increasingly likely to verify claims of educational credentials
and prior experience on resumes, and to run checks of driving history and credit records.
(Hollinger and Langton, 2005) I know of no efforts to validate these mechanisms, but they are
also likely to be very noisy indicators of propensity to workplace theft or shirking. Credit and
driving records will not even be available for the very young.
On-the-job screening seems more promising, closer to the ideal of “what you see is what
you get”. About two-thirds of employers in Holzer’s 1982 sample in fact used probationary
periods. (Temporary help services often play a similar role.) But employers must bear the costs
not just of wages and training, but also of probationary employees’ mistakes or malfeasance, and
the costs of supervision and liability. These are offset to some extent by lower wages during the
trial period. However, a fundamental problem remains: someone determined to game the system
will be on her best behavior during the probationary period. Union contracts, formal personnel
procedures, civil service regulations, individual contracts, case law on unreasonable discharge,
and considerations of collective worker morale all make it more difficult to dismiss an employee
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after the probationary period, or to reduce compensation, so there is little incentive for
opportunistic workers to continue the same degree of effort, honesty, or cooperation upon
becoming fully vested in the job. A probationary period is not a clearly superior alternative to a
pre-employment test; the ratio of marginal product to cost may not be more favorable for
probation than pre-employment testing.
The most common screening device of all, the personal interview, is also the most
problematic. Five out of six employers in Holzer’s 1982 sample used interviews. Almost nine out
of ten employers in the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (1992-1994) used interviews. More
employers used interviews than physical exams, probationary periods, reference checks, preemployment tests, criminal checks, written applications, and references. (Holzer, 1987; Stoll,
et.al., 2004) The personnel literature raises many concerns about the validity of interviews.
Holzer (1987) found that interviews (as well as reference checks and probationary periods) had
little predictive value for a manager’s rating of a new hire’s productivity relative to other
employees; if anything, the relationship was generally negative. In the personnel psychology
literature, their validity is also very low, typically below 0.2. (Herriott, 1989; Cook, 1988;
Schmitt and Chan, 1998; Mercer, 1993; Arvey and Campion, 1982) There is an interesting and
important pattern here, with employers demonstrating the greatest confidence in interviews, the
least valid form of screening.7 (More on this later.)
There are indeed some better tools for assessing character. Surveillance and FBI-type
background checks are far more accurate than integrity testing, references, and interviews, but
they are very expensive, limiting their use in the low-wage labor market. They are also very
invasive, and as such they could foster tremendous resentment among potential employees.
7

There are other reasons for the popularity of interviews, such as the opportunity to sell the organization to the job
applicant. Interviews can also be improved with more formal design. But interviewers typically have access to more
valid predictors (resumes, references, etc.), and part of the measured predictive validity of the interview is doubtless
due instead to these other factors. (Ulrich and Trumbo, 1965)
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Innovations in screening may change the tradeoff between costs and effectiveness, but the
improvements are likely to be modest given the formidable challenges inherent in assessing
character.
Two main points follow from this summary of screening. First, “any testing operation,
even a trial period, is some form of personnel investment” (Arrow, 1974, p. 96), whose expected
yield depends on predictive validity. Even the most rigorously validated mechanisms for
assessing character involve a formidable amount of testing error, especially for the young who
lack experience and labor market connections. If there are diminishing returns to particular
methods, they become more costly as they are applied to increasingly ambiguous cases. Given
the weakness of any individual job applicant’s signals about honesty or work ethic, the hiring
decision seems to involve a substantial degree of Keynesian uncertainty, in which agents simply
cannot form mathematical expectations. “The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of
the basis of knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made.” (Keynes,
1964, p. 149) While the possibility of no mathematical expectation sounds peculiar to modern
ears, a more plausible reformulation would simply describe a large confidence internval for the
prediction of quality, where the noise drowns out the value of the correlation between test results
and quality. I suggest that employers’ expectations are much closer to this scenario than to one in
which prospective quality is so well understood that race is irrelevant. As such, employers, like
investors, respond by invoking heuristics of dubious validity, which will be “compatible with a
considerable measure of continuity and stability in our affairs, so long as we can rely on the
maintenance of the convention.” (Keynes, 1964, p. 152, emphasis in original) Because honesty
and conscientiousness can be faked in the screening process, the informational problem is more
vexing for the appraisal of character than ability, and stronger ability signals do not help:
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integrity test scores are largely orthogonal to cognitive ability scores. (Ones, Viswesvaran and
Schmidt 1993)
Second, employers rely most heavily on the least valid form of screening, the personal
interview, which is often the first opportunity for the employer to directly appraise the person
associated with the observable credentials. The fact that employers are overly sanguine about
their own judgment in these face-to-face encounters should not be surprising; psychologists have
repeatedly documented a clear human bias toward overconfidence in one’s own opinions. (For
example, see Fischof, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977).) The way that employers read and utilize
data from interviews is therefore of considerable interest, and will be discussed below in
conjunction with more sophisticated treatments of SDT than the simple textbook version.
One final consideration involves the role of equal opportunity and affirmative action
requirements. Darity and Mason have argued that “If average group differences are real, then in
a world with antidiscrimination laws, employers are likely to find methods of predicting the
future performance of potential employees with sufficient accuracy that there is no need to use
the additional ‘signal’ of race or gender.” (1998, p. 83, emphasis mine) Indeed, affirmative
action is associated with more rigorous screening procedures, and more formalized personnel
procedures with greater hiring of minorities. (Holzer and Neumark, 2000; Bielby and Baron) But
if some employers are firmly convinced that blacks are more dishonest at work,
antidiscrimination laws will motivate these employers to substitute indicators that are strongly
correlated with race. (Lundberg, 1991) These include marital status, residential zip codes, and
names (Kirschenman and Neckerman, 1991; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Legal precedents
about disparate impact would seem to render many of these mechanisms legally suspect, but the
government has an information and enforcement problem of its own that overlays the firm’s
information problem.
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My point is simply that our inability to get more than modest results from common,
longstanding screening procedures for character, leaves an informational vacuum – and an equal
opportunity enforcement vacuum – in which prior conceptions of racial differences can flourish.
When screening is especially costly or uninformative, when the perceptual muck is especially
thick, the inclination to rely on cheap and historically salient indices, such as race, can be very
strong.
How Workers Send Signals
High-quality workers have strong incentives to volunteer for tests. However, it takes
quite a bit of infrastructure for firms to have confidence in the tests. It won’t help a worker on
her own to volunteer for a test that the employer has no experience with, or that doesn’t bear the
imprimatur of an ostensibly scientific test publisher. And workers can’t easily volunteer for a
probationary period that the employer has not established already (resolving issues of
supervision, liability, etc.). Furthermore, unions, who have done so much historically to
rationalize – indeed, create – internal labor markets (Jacoby, 1985), rarely have any control over
the external selection process, because job applicants are not bargaining unit members.
When the infrastructure does exist, jobseekers do try to project good signals: they invest
heavily in education; they join the military; they get tips from friends and relatives on how to
present themselves positively in interviews; they take temporary jobs that enable the employer to
observe them first-hand. Applying for a low-wage job often means de facto volunteering to take
a test: the millions of integrity tests that are administered annually, or the General Aptitude Test
Battery which is also taken by millions of job seekers each year through the U.S. Employment
Service. (Sackett and Wilk, 1994) Workers do take advantage of available signaling
opportunities, but they can’t create credible signaling devices on their own.
Racial Differences in Testing Error and Mean Quality

18

In this section I investigate the empirical basis for inferring racial differences in the mean
of work ethic and honesty, and the variance of testing error. Is there any evidence to suggest that
the noise-to-signal ratio in screening for character is higher for blacks, as the first Phelps
scenario suggested? Is there any indication that black workers actually do have lower mean
honesty and work effort, as the second Phelps scenario would require?
Phelps case (1): Racial differences in testing error. The most direct kind of evidence for
the error variance hypothesis would show that the white curve relating productivity to test scores
is steeper than the corresponding black curve, with employers thinking that whites are more
qualified at high test scores and blacks more qualified at low test scores. There is no such
evidence concerning honesty or motivation.
But there are many reasons to suspect a racial difference in testing error, and plenty of
experimental evidence. Blacks are less likely to have personal contacts within firms than whites,
and these personal contacts could provide information about applicant quality with relatively low
error. Also, cultural miscommunication may reduce the ability of white hiring agents to read the
signals of black job applicants, resulting in job segregation (Lang, 1986), or a lower black
probability of being hired (Cornell and Bradford, 1996). Personal interviews are particularly
susceptible to miscommunication, arising perhaps from group differences in linguistic
conventions or body language. More importantly, social psychologists have found that one of the
more automatic components of human cognition is the strong tendency to see same-group
members as more heterogeneous and out-group members as more homogeneous. (Fiske, 1998)
Also, white social discomfort in the presence of blacks seems to increase the extent of random
error. Word, Zanna, and Cooper (1974) found that white subjects conducting mock interviews
with trained black applicants made more speech errors, asked fewer questions, and ran shorter
interviews than with similar white applicants.
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Aigner and Cain (quoted earlier) argued that employers should be able to reduce excess
noise from black signaling, and this view receives some support from two lines of work. First,
there is some evidence that employers have trouble reading black signals of cognitive ability
early in their careers, but develop more information as workers gain more experience. (Pinkston,
2006) Employers probably also learn through experience about character, although to a lesser
extent because dishonesty and shirking are relatively easily concealed. Second, black hiring
officers seem to do a better job reading own-group signals. Stoll et. al. (2004) and Raphael et. al.
(2000) found that black hiring officers hire somewhat more black workers (after controlling for
the black application rate), despite the fact that they are more likely than white hiring officers to
work in firms with stricter hiring requirements and screening methods. Blacks are also more
likely to supervise other blacks (Smith and Elliott, 2002) These observations may support the
notion that some employers have discovered the value of “bilingual” blacks as interpreters: they
speak “black” in the presence of blacks, they speak “white” in the presence of whites, and they
move more easily across the racial linguistic and cultural divide than whites. (Ogbu, 1999) (Of
course, other interpretations are possible, too.) However, when the issue specifically is character,
there is anecdotal evidence that blacks sometimes succumb to the same kinds of stereotypes that
whites do.8 While it should surprise no one that blacks read black signals better than whites, it is
also reasonable to suppose that blacks sometimes adopt the same racialized conventions as other
Americans.
I’m going out on a limb here, but consider the following. The Reverend Jesse Jackson told a Washington Post
reporter, “There is nothing more painful to me at this stage in my life than to walk down a street and hear footsteps
and start thinking about robbery – then look around and see somebody white and feel relieved.” (quoted in Tonry,
1995) Barack Obama recounted his experience of blacks stigmatizing blacks, starting with an episode in which a
black woman, Ruby, began to wear blue contact lenses: “Ruby shook up this predisposition of mine, the wall I had
erected between psychology and politics, the state of our pocketbooks and the state of our souls. In fact, that
particular episode was only the most dramatic example of what I was hearing and seeing every day. It was expressed
when a black leader casually explained to me that he never dealt with black contractors (“A black man’ll just mess it
up, and I’ll end up paying white folks to do it all over again”); or in another leader’s rationale for why she couldn’t
mobilize other people in her church (“Black folks are just lazy, Barack – don’t wanna do nothing”).” (Obama, 2004,
p. 194)

8
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Phelps case (2): Racial differences in mean quality. Phelps suggested that blacks may
have lower unobserved quality than whites, given test scores, because of social background.
However, there are no differences in the mean integrity test scores or pass rates of blacks and
whites.9 (Sackett and Harris, 1985; Sackett and Wanek, 1996; Ones et. al., 1993) Although
scores on these tests are often poorly correlated with measures of counterproductive workplace
behavior, there is little reason to suspect that they are racially biased.10 We can infer some
supporting evidence for this by looking at two correlates of retail theft by employees: part-time
status and turnover. (Hollinger, 2005) Blacks are less likely than whites to work part-time, and
studies have typically not found that black turnover is higher. Blau and Kahn (1981), for
example, concluded that racial differences in quit rates were not large after controlling for
earnings, job tenure, unionization, and other characteristics. Similarly, using absenteeism as one
admittedly imperfect measure of work ethic, race does not make a difference after controlling for
earnings, scheduling flexibility, and health. (Allen, 1981) For a group of welfare recipients in
four cities in 1998-99, Holzer et. al. (2004) found no significant differences between blacks and
whites in absenteeism, or in other job problems (including attitudes, relationships with
coworkers, and substance abuse), when controlling for a variety of human capital, establishment,
and job characteristics.
I found no study asking whether race or social background is associated with theft at
work. Nor is there ever likely to be a convincing one. Explanations based on social background
would have to be distinguished from reasons that are specific to the workplace. Any observed
9

Group differences in pass rates may be sensitive to the cut score, but this issue is seldom raised. There is also the
possibility of selection bias. This is addressed sometimes, to some extent, in validation studies, as when the sample
consists of employees who were hired regardless of their test scores. (Sackett and Harris, 1985) This does not solve
the selection problem completely, however, insofar as employers usually attempt to assess honesty before hiring
decisions by using other means, such as the verification of claims of experience and education on resumes.
10
Test publishers may have incentives both to construct tests that provide accurate information to employers, and to
minimize the appearance of lower black integrity, since any test with a black-white pass-rate ratio lower than 80% is
subject to much greater scrutiny by the EEOC, as has been the case for pre-employment cognitive ability tests. (Joy,
1991, p. 82) However, I have found no indication in the literature that anyone is worried about this in practice.
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group differences in the probability of stealing will depend on aspects of the employment
relationship that are difficult to measure: the fallback position of workers in the event of
dismissal, the degree of monitoring and the opportunity for theft, the size and structure of
personnel incentives, and workers’ perceptions of the firm’s commitment to its employees. Each
of these is likely to be correlated with race and socioeconomic background.
Social disadvantage is in large part a deterrent to workplace theft. This is best illustrated
by considering the two-period value of the current job for the worker:
Vt = [ wt + (1 − m) S t ] + r {[(1 − m)( wt +1 + S t +1 )] + m[ p ( w At +1 + (1 − m) S At +1 ) + (1 − p)Tt +1 ]} . In period
t, V is a function of the wage w, plus the undetected amount of workplace stealing or slacking
(1-m)S, where m is the monitoring rate, assumed equal to the probability of dismissal,11 and

S = s (ϕ , π , m) . ϕ is the psychic disutility of S and π is the job-specific opportunity for theft or
shirking for reasons other than the monitoring rate (e.g., it’s easier to steal a wad of cash than a
steel beam). If someone scrupulously adheres to norms against theft, then ϕ > 0, and
∂S / ∂π = δS / δm = 0. The discount rate is r; the probability of finding another job, given

dismissal, is p; Tt+1 is non-employment income.
Based on Vt, the following mean racial differences in the propensity to steal or slack may
be noted. (1) Black alternative employment prospects p are worse than those of whites, since
their unemployment rate is twice as high. The racial wage gap is not as large as the employment
gap, so the value of the current job is likely to be greater for blacks, with correspondingly lower
incentives for blacks to steal from employers.
(2) There is a racial difference in m: blacks work less independently and are monitored
somewhat more closely than whites. (McCrate, 2005; Lucas, 1974; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993)

11

The probability of dismissal is almost identical to the probability of apprehension in the case of retail theft.
(Hollinger, 2004)
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Blacks will be caught stealing or shirking more often than whites of comparable rectitude and
diligence. Black workers also have less control over their schedules. (McCrate, 2005) As such,
they are more likely to be noticed and penalized at work for lapses in attendance or punctuality,
relative to whites with similar records.12
(3) There is also a racial difference in π: blacks are underrepresented in jobs that present
lucrative opportunities for financial fraud (including what fraud examiners delicately refer to as
“misappropriation of assets” for personal use): bookkeepers, internal auditors, fiscal officers, and
executive officers. These jobs arguably present greater opportunities for damage to the firm than
employee theft of cash or merchandise. The Treadway Commission’s careful study of firms
subject to enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission found that the
median financial statement misstatement or misappropriation of assets was $4.1 million,
compared to the median company’s total assets of $16 million, and that the typical perpetrator
was a highly placed executive. (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission, 1999) The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2004) estimated (very
loosely) that employee fraud in the U.S. cost $660 billion in 2003, about 6% of an organization’s
total revenues. This dwarfs the magnitude of employee theft of merchandise or cash in the retail
sector (0.8% of sales (National Retail Security Survey)), where blacks are more commonly
employed. Financial fraud also frequently results in bankruptcy, financial penalties, changes in
ownership, and delisting by national exchanges. Blacks seldom have opportunities for such
exorbitant dishonesty.

12

Blacks would, however, be more likely to miss work or quit jobs to the extent that race is associated with
unreliable transportation or childcare, lending some credence to the second Phelps scenario. The Phelps idea would
also receive additional support if blacks skip work or quit their jobs more often because of worse job matches – for
example, if supervisors or coworkers are uncooperative. However, recall that race was not a significant predictor of
turnover and absenteeism in the Allen, Blau and Kahn, and Holzer studies, despite the fact that these studies did not
control for transportation, childcare, and quality of job match. Their estimates are therefore conservative. Black
workers are not so much missing work due to these problems as they are getting to work in spite of them – not
surprising behavior for a group that has more to fear from unemployment.
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Employers’ Prior Expectations of Character and Self-Fulfilling Racial Stereotypes

Doubtless there are employers who simply can’t read the signals of blacks (perhaps some
of the employers who tell social scientists that they see no clear racial differences in work ethic).
To suppose otherwise would be contrary to volumes of experimental psychological evidence that
observers overestimate other-group homogeneity. But even if intercultural miscommunication
makes black signals noiser than white signals, this doesn’t mean that black signals are interpreted
neutrally. Social psychologists have found that perceptions of outgroup homogeneity are
associated with stereotyping; people who believe there is little outgroup variance also make
stereotypic judgments about outgroup members more readily than people who perceive more
outgroup variance. (Fiske, 1998) The problem is not just noisy signals, but the way that agents
handle noise when race is involved.
Stereotypes strongly influence the assessment of ambiguous signals (Darley and Gross,
1983), precisely the type that are likely to be projected in the ubiquitous but notoriously lowvalidity hiring interview. Even though observers may not be willing to categorize people as
dishonest or lazy solely on the basis of race or socioeconomic background, they seem to form
hypotheses about group-specific dispositions that they then regard as confirmed by ambiguous
signals. A listless white interviewee, for example, may be seen as tired or having a bad day,
while a similar black interviewee may be viewed as unmotivated. Ambiguity is a constant theme
in psychological literature on the factors triggering stereotyping. (Fiske, 1998)
This anomaly for the error variance model, the willingness of many employers to
interpret noisy black signals in a way that is qualitatively different from noisy white signals,
provides a starting point for a distinct tradition of SDT based on employers’ conditional
expectations of black and white productivity. The first of these models were developed by
Spence (1974) and Arrow (1974). In both models, employers’ priors concerning black and white
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unobservables are incorporated in wage offers. Black workers respond to any negative
expectations embodied in wages by investing differently in signals (Spence) or skills (Arrow).
Labor market equilibria are not unique in these models, and black and white wages could easily
end up at different equilibria as a result of the initial probability assessments of employers, not
because of initial differences in the distribution of productivity.
Following Arrow and Spence, Coate and Loury (1993) developed an account of “selfconfirming racial stereotypes” in a job assignment model. An employer’s posterior probability
that a worker is qualified for a more responsible13 and desirable job is a function both of an
applicant’s signal θ (such as a test score), and the employer’s own beliefs or stereotypes about
the worker’s group (πi). The employer assigns workers to the more responsible job if and only if

θ ≥ s * (π ) . The cutoff s* is decreasing in π, because the employer gives the benefit of the doubt
to applicants she believes are more likely to be qualified. For workers, the net benefit of
investing in the necessary traits depends on the employer’s cutoff; Coate and Loury assume that
there is little point to investing when standards are very high or very low, and thus the percentage
of workers who are qualified for the more responsible job, initially increases, then decreases with
s*. Equilibrium occurs when employers’ expectations about group i’s qualifications are
consistent with workers’ investment behavior given s*, which is itself contingent on the
employer’s prior beliefs about the group’s qualifications. Because of the shape of the functions
describing worker and employer behavior, and assuming that employers update their priors based
on worker behavior in the previous period, there are potentially multiple stable equilibria. As in
Arrow and Spence, different equilibria may be associated with different groups. Thus if firms
initially believe that blacks are less qualified than whites, workers invest so as to confirm the

13

Coate and Loury differentiated the two jobs based on skill, not level of responsibility. But since I’m considering
honesty and work ethic, I have made this alteration.
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expectations. Blacks come to have the traits that are associated with them, simply because others
expect them to be that way, whether that is initially correct or not.
Evidence on Self-Confirming Stereotypes

Certainly blacks are stereotyped as dishonest starting at a very young age. In her field
work in an integrated elementary school, Ferguson (2001) found that teachers had characterized
a group of black male ten-year olds as budding felons (“’bound for jail’”, “’unsalvageable’”,
“’he’s on the fast track to San Quentin’”, “’that one has a jail-cell with his name on it’”(pp. 9,
96)).14 And the self-confirming nature of stereotypes has been documented repeatedly by
psychologists. For example, it can happen even within the interview process: in one experiment,
coached white interviewers maintained more physical distance from black interviewees, gave
them less interview time, and made more speech errors; these behaviors in turn elicited worse
performance and greater physical distance by the interviewees. (Word, Zanna, and Cooper, 1974)
The self-confirming racial stereotype model concludes that people eventually conform to
the dominant social expectations for their group. If blacks are expected to be less diligent or less
honest, a substantial number will become so. This accords well with the Altonji and Pierret
(1997) results of a negative and significant coefficient on black*experience, and a small,
insignificant coefficient on black alone, in a wage regression using the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth. (Their own interpretation, however, is that employers are simply following the
law by not initially screening on race, but developing knowledge about preexisting lower black
quality over time.)
So, it is hard empirically to distinguish Altonji and Pierret’s employer learning model
from a self-confirming stereotype model, and there is some prima facie support for either of

14

These black youngsters had committed no illegal acts at school; they rarely missed classes and were usually on
time. They did get into fights. However, school personnel had not characterized similarly testy, rambunctious white
boys as incipient criminals.
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these. However, it is not immediately obvious that the self-confirming stereotype account can be
reconciled with (1) the available evidence that black workers are just as honest as whites, and
that their turnover and absenteeism are no worse than that of whites; and (2) the observation that
social disadvantage is a deterrent to theft.
But the door is still open for a self-confirming stereotype account. There are three reasons
for this. First, although the studies cited earlier found that race is not associated with absenteeism
or turnover after controlling for wages, tenure, etc., these regressors were taken to be exogenous.
If instead some part of their measured effect on quit rates and absenteeism is due to an
unmeasured, stereotype-driven racial difference in quits and unscheduled absences on wages and
job tenure, the estimates are biased.
A second way to reconcile the theoretical prediction of lower black quality with the
empirical evidence is through the observation that social disadvantage can be a cause of theft or
low effort, at the same time that it is a deterrent. The possibility of a correlation between theft
and disadvantage is not because of need, which is subjective and relative. (Regardless of income
level, Americans think they need about 25% more income than they earn (Levine and Rizvi,
2005); in that respect most of us, including CEO’s and CFO’s, have similar motivations for
theft.) Rather, social disadvantage is more likely to contribute to theft or shirking because of
workers’ normative responses to punishment. Black effort and honesty remain suspect, and
blacks are monitored more closely than whites. Consequently they will be caught and punished
more often for the occasional petty theft or slacking that a fairly large number of employees of
all races engage in. (McCrate, 2005) This has on the one hand a disincentive effect. But on the
other hand, when punishment is exceptionally frequent or severe, workers respond normatively:
shirking increases. (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Bewley, 2000) While dishonesty is perhaps less
likely to increase, because norms about honesty are less malleable than norms about work
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effort15, some occupational psychologists do think that excessive reliance on negative incentives
can also backfire here. (Murphy, 1993) Nagin, et. al. (2002) found that the tendency to falsely
claim incentive pay (when workers believed they were not being closely monitored) decreased
when employees felt that the employer was treating them well.
A third point to keep in mind when trying to reconcile the self-confirming stereotype
model and the empirical evidence involves the question of what precisely is the relevant data in
the distribution of honesty and effort. The Phelps tradition of SDT focuses on racial differences
in the expectation or variance of worker quality or racial differences. The regressions reported
above on absenteeism and quit rates concerned the conditional expectation of the dependent
variable. But the self-confirming stereotype model concerns the worker with marginal screening
data. In Coate and Loury, employers give the benefit of the doubt to white but not black
applicants with test scores at the margin (near s*). The Darley and Gross study also found that
stereotypes are activated more often when there is ambiguity.16 A disproportionate share of
young blacks is at the margin, with little employment history, few if any references, and minor
criminal records. There is evidence from employment audits that white job applicants with minor
criminal records get callbacks from employers significantly more often than blacks with similar
records. (Pager, 2003)17 For those who do get hired, more intensive monitoring of black workers

15

WalMart tries to extend “hard” norms about dishonesty to work effort by impressing upon its workers the idea of
“time theft” in initial training and continuing internal propaganda.
16
In conventional wage regressions with the usual human capital variables using recent data, the mean effect of
being black is typically on the order of seven to twelve percent. (Altonji and Blank, 1999) Economists have been
puzzled by the difference between these relatively small estimates, and the much greater evidence of discrimination
that comes from employment audits (as in Pager, 2003; see also Turner, Fix and Struyk, 1991) Coate and Loury’s
model suggests a way to resolve this conundrum. It centrally concerns the black worker with marginal test scores,
not the average black worker. It predicts that statistical discrimination is concentrated at the margin. While
regression studies have looked at race effects for the mean black worker, employment audits have used young
testers presenting relatively limited resumes, a much more marginal group.
17
Pager also found a slightly higher probability of a callback for a white tester with a criminal record than a black
tester without a record, but this difference was not statistically significant. It should also be noted that her results are
not inconsistent with the results that employers are more likely to hire blacks when they use criminal background
checks (Holzer, Raphael and Stoll, 2002), because here the improvement in black hiring happens among those who
do not have a record.
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will result in greater detection of infractions, in turn leading to fewer promotions, fewer good
references, and a greater probability of dismissal. In turn, many unemployed or marginally
employed black youth will see less reason to follow the straight and narrow road. Young blacks
at the margin, relegated to the growing pool of blacks whose connections to the formal economy
are eroding, become what employers fear. The growing proportion of young blacks with criminal
records (because of the war on drugs, which has been excessively targeted at black communities
(Tonry, 1995)) has indeed contributed to their declining attachment to the formal economy.
Lagged incarceration rates have reduced the employment of young black men by about two to
four percent in the last twenty years, and labor force participation by about three to five percent.
(Holzer, Offner, and Sorensen, 2005) And when they disappear from the labor force, they also
disappear from our data. Self-confirming stereotypes have arguably done their greatest damage
among those whom we are least likely to find in wage, employment, or screening data.
Why Doesn’t the Market Punish Statistical Discriminators?

There are several reasons for this. First, expected differences in employee quality arise
endogenously. Second, much of the opportunity cost of stereotyping is externalized onto black
workers. Third, human cognition is vulnerable to the ill-founded notion that recent patterns will
persist, regardless of the underlying causes. Fourth, coordination problems inhibit firms from
acting to stop stereotypes.
Endogenous differences in quality. In both the Lundberg and Startz (1983) model based
on differences in error variance, and the Coate and Loury (1993) model based on employers’
priors, the market never penalizes firms for their errors. Instead, blacks come to have the traits
that are associated with them, even though that is initially not the case.
External costs. When unobserved worker quality is endogenous, as in Coate and Loury
(1993) or Lundberg and Startz (1983), firms do not take into account the benefits that would
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accrue from improving black workers’ incentives to increase their unobserved productivity.
Furthermore, in order to compensate for the discounting of their unobservable skills or the
greater noise in the test data for blacks, high-productivity blacks have incentives to invest more
in observable signals, such as education. (Lang 1990) After controlling for socioeconomic
background, blacks do get more college education than whites. (Griliches, 1977; Haveman and
Wolfe, 1994; Mason, 1997) This is a Coase-like Pareto-improving strategy, but like all Coase
solutions, it is hardly distribution-neutral. The costs of information problems can be largely
externalized to blacks, who have to invest more than whites in observable signals to get
equivalent labor market outcomes, but who have fewer resources to do so.
Cognitive failure. Keynes observed that a fair amount of stability can be maintained in
markets as long as conventions remain intact. A persistent human tendency to think that the
future will resemble the past, without considering the reasons for recent patterns, buttresses such
conventions. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) If observers think that blacks are exogenously less
honest or motivated, they see little reason for change – and they certainly do not perceive their
own role in contributing to self-fulfilling racial stereotypes. Hence Loury’s notion of “biased
social cognition” (2002): observers mistake endogenous differences in group performance for
exogenous differences. Thus, while Keynes’ financial markets are characterized by the periodic
collapse of reigning conventions, racial stereotyping has been much slower to recede.
Coordination problems. Although stopping a self-confirming stereotype in its tracks is
Pareto superior to leaving it unchallenged, Loury points out that most firms, as “competitive
observers”, cannot affect worker investment incentives by examining their own stereotypes or
job assignment practices, because they cannot affect overall social stereotypes by themselves.
Smaller observers, such as some small firms, also do not have the resources to collect large
amounts of data systematically and process it under alternative assumptions. (Schauer, 2003)
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Loury (2002) further argues that “monopolistic observers”, such as very large firms, who
do have the “power to create facts” (p. 40), are typically disinterested in experimenting with
alternative explanations of racial inequality. The problem lies not so much at the level of
inference, “the quantitative calculation of parameters from the available data”, as it does at the
level of specification, “the qualitative framework guiding an agent’s data processing” (pp. 4546), which is logically prior to inference. In short, what’s missing is the cognitive means to
recognize a social problem, and thus to recognize a profitable opportunity. This doesn’t mean
that employers’ perceptions cannot change. However, that kind of change – which would involve
highly self-conscious consideration of the way that agents unconsciously interpret ambiguous
and incomplete information – is the result of an overwhelming anomaly, a shocking event that
unhinges a specification, or a lengthy process of reflection. The latter is not likely to be
encouraged when the beliefs of everyone else in the same symbolic community are virtually
identical, and virtually no social institutions other than academia (at times) encourage it.
Therefore, observing agents are likely to be cognitively disabled, unable to distinguish
endogenous from exogenous patterns, even unable to see opportunities for competitive
advantage. The problem is not restricted to agents who readily state that blacks are dishonest or
lazy. It extends to anyone who needs to process ambiguous signals, who has not carefully and
self-consciously evaluated her own specification. “The image of the perceiver as a hypothesis
tester is certainly more appealing than that of a stereotype applying bigot, even though the end
result of both processes, sadly enough, may be quite similar.” (Darley and Gross, 1983, pp. 3233)
Racial Stigma

For Loury, this problem of specification is greatly compounded by stigma, the visceral
sense of a separate and unequal humanity between whites and blacks. When the stigma concerns
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character, blacks’ perceived moral deficiencies seem to be causing their own problems, and
whites seem to have no role. Stigma excludes blacks from the moral community, those we are
obliged to help, and those from whom we in turn expect assistance.
In particular, racial stigma, and the stereotypes of dishonesty and laziness, seem to
exclude blacks from what we might call a “community of reciprocity” in the workplace. In this
community, employers share surplus with their workers, and workers respond with greater effort.
(Fehr and Gachter, 2000) All the stylized facts about African Americans in the workforce –
lower wages, higher unemployment, more monitoring, less autonomy and independence at work
– suggest that employers are more likely to adopt a strategy of motivating blacks through explicit
punishment rather than through reciprocity. This has a long and sordid history. Southern planters,
from the eighteenth century and well into the 20th century, relied heavily on negative incentives
for performance. Planters were utterly convinced that blacks would not work without coercion.
One investigator who surveyed white opinion for President Andrew Johnson in 1865 reported:
“In at least nineteen cases of twenty the reply I received to my inquiry…was uniformly this: ‘You
cannot make the negro work without physical compulsion.’ I heard this hundreds of times, heard it
wherever I went, heard it in nearly the same words from so many different persons, that at last I came to the
conclusion that this is the prevailing sentiment among the southern people.’” (Schurz, 1865, quoted in
Ransom and Sutch, 1977, p. 21)

Workers’ effort levels respond negatively in response to explicit punishment;
experimental evidence suggests that “explicit [negative] incentives may ‘crowd out’ reciprocal
effort choices” (Fehr and Gachter, 2000, p. 171), even to the extent that a punishment strategy is
less efficient than a reciprocal strategy. These authors found that the aggregate surplus to be
shared between employers and workers was smaller when employers used explicit fines for
shirking, but that employers’ profits were higher because of lower reliance on generous wage
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offers. To the extent that the stigmatization of blacks results in lower wages and greater
punishment, black workers bear most of the burden of stereotyping.
Conclusion

Honesty and work ethic are extraordinarily difficult to screen for. In addition, employers
have a definite preference for screening through the least efficient mechanism, the personal
interview. The tremendous amount of uncertainty involved in assessing character leads
employers to fall back on racialized conventions about black laziness and dishonesty in the
evaluation of the ambiguous signals that abound in interviews and other testing mechanisms,
even when employers are unwilling to act as overt bigots. Employers, like the rest of us, do not
interpret perceptual data in a racial vacuum. Young black people, whose track records in the
workplace are scant to nonexistent, are particularly vulnerable to such stereotyping, even more so
if they have minor criminal records. Racialized conventions are quite stable, despite their
inefficiency in a number of respects, because they are difficult to disconfirm, and they lead to
self-fulfilling prophecies. In the case of honesty and work ethic, there is close to a “perfect
storm” of exceptionally strong historical stereotypes and exceptionally ambiguous information.
Young black people with little education, little experience, and few connections, are becoming
daily more entangled with the criminal justice system, and more isolated from the formal
economy, with fewer incentives and means to seek a way back.
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